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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS OF 
THE HONOR SYSTEM 
I ASSURE you that I consider it a privi- 
lege and an honor to address you on 
this occasion. I particularly appreciate 
talking to such a large group of students 
about student government. And it has 
seemed to me that I can make no better 
use of the time set apart for my discussion 
than to present for your consideration what 
I regard as certain misconceptions of the 
honor system. 
Among my many duties as a teacher of 
philosophy is the very delightful one of con- 
ducting each year a course in logic. On 
one occasion while conducting this course 
I assigned to groups of students the task of 
working out and bringing in illustrations 
of the dilemma as a form of argument, and 
the various ways of meeting this particular 
form of argument. The dilemma brought 
in by one of these groups was most inter- 
esting. It had to do with the honor system 
and was designed to show that this institu- 
tion ought to be abolished. As I recall it, 
the argument went somewhat as follows : 
If those who live under the honor system are 
possessed of a high sense of honor, the system 
is unnecessary and ought therefore to be abolish- 
ed ; and if those who live under this system do 
not possess a high sense of honor, it is impossible 
to maintain the system, and it ought therefore to 
be abolished. But those who live under the honor 
system either do or do not possess a high sense of 
honor. So that in either case this institution 
ought to be abolished, either because it is un- 
necessary or because it is impossible to maintain 
it. 
All of which sounded very formidable, 
indeed. But the arguments advanced to 
meet this formidable dilemma were quite 
equal to the occasion. On the one hand. 
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it was contended that the alternatives pro- 
posed by the dilemma are not mutually ex- 
clusive, inasmuch as a student body is, as 
a matter of fact, composed of both honor- 
able and dishonorable types of students, 
and that if only the former are in the ma- 
jority, the honor system can and ought to 
be maintained to the gradual elimination 
of those who are unfit to live under it. On 
the other hand, it was argued that the alter- 
natives of honorable or dishonorable student 
bodies are not only not mutually exclusive, 
but that these alternatives are not exhaus- 
tive, inasmuch as there is a third possibility, 
namely, a student body composed of those 
who are neither entirely honorable nor dis- 
honorable, but composed, rather, of those 
who are in process of becoming honorable 
or dishonorable, as the case may be; and 
that with reference to any actual student 
body, made up as it is of such immature 
and unformed persons, the function of the 
honor system is not only to regulate, by 
eliminating the unfit, but also and more 
especially to educate by helping to create an 
environment which is most favorable to the 
development of honorable traits and honor- 
able behavior. 
Now it occurred to me as I considered the 
pros and cons of this debate, that these two 
ingenuous methods of meeting what was no 
doubt a purely academic attack on the honor 
system are typical of two more or less dis- 
tinct conceptions of the nature and func- 
tion of this institution. One of these con- 
ceptions is that the honor system is pri- 
marily, if not exclusively, a form of stu- 
dent government; and the other is that, 
because no form of self-government can be 
permanently adequate unless it is educative 
as well as regulative in its effects, the honor 
system must aim at producing such effects 
in the characters of those who live under it 
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if it is to regulate their conduct in a perma- 
nently effective manner. It is the former 
of these two conceptions, namely, the con- 
ception of the honor system as being essenti- 
ally regulative rather than educative in its 
intent, that I. regard as a misconception. 
And it is this misconception of the honor 
system that I wish you to consider first. 
And let us begin by distinguishing be- 
tween two meanings of the term "honor" 
as used in connection with the honor sys- 
tem, which have not always been carefully 
distinguished by those who have thought 
on this matter. In the first place, then, 
"honor" may be said to have an ethical 
connotation in that it refers to those stand- 
ards of action which are considered by the 
members of any student community as being 
indispensible to the welfare, if not to very 
existence of that community. But the term 
may also be said to have a psychological 
connotation in that it refers to the traits 
in the characters of those who make up the 
student community which dispose them to 
conform to such standards of action as 
being matters of honor, and which we there- 
fore think of as constituting their "sense of 
honor." 
Now the standards of action regarded by 
any generation of students as being matters 
of honor may or may not be truly objective, 
that is, truly representative of their best in- 
terests ; but in either case the sense of honor 
which many students bring with them to 
college will on the whole fall short of the 
requirements of the honor code under which 
they must live. The reasons for this are 
obvious. The student's sense of honor is 
not inherited; it is acquired. And it is ac- 
quired in some specific environment. It 
is, therefore, relative to that environment. 
But the environments in which students are 
reared and in which they acquire the sense 
of honor they bring with them to college 
are apt to differ from the college environ- 
ment in one or the other, or in both of two 
respects. On the one hand the ideals of the 
former may be inferior to those of the lat- 
ter. On the other hand the two sets of 
ideals may simply be different in that they 
have developed with reference to dissimilar 
situations and types of interest. And in 
any case, influences must be brought to bear 
on the immature student to improve, or if 
that be unnecessary, at least to modify and 
expand his "sense of honor" in appropriate 
directions. 
Now it is my conviction that the honor 
system is, or at least should be, one of the 
educative influences thus brought to bear 
on the immature student. This is possibly 
not the traditional conception of the nature 
and function of this institution. The tradi- 
tional conception would seem to be that 
the honor system is essentially a regulative 
instrument and, incidentally, a device for 
separating the sheep from the goats, or a 
sort of sieve for sifting out the good grain 
from the worthless chaff. The presupposi- 
tion back of such a notion of the honor 
system is a static view of human nature, 
and more especially of those elements in 
human nature which constitute a "sense of 
honor." But for a college which pretends 
to be an educational institution to subscribe 
to a system of student control which itself 
makes no pretense to being educative in 
its effects, and for the college to deal with 
students as being immature or undeveloped 
with reference to knowledge and yet as 
being finished products with reference to 
morals, would seem to be, to say the least, 
a contradiction in terms. 
And so I think we must conclude that 
the college is logically committed to the 
conception of the honor system as being 
essentially educative and not merely regula- 
tive (or shall we say eliminative?) in its 
intent and result. But what difference will 
this conception make in the administration 
of the honor system where it is consciously 
grasped and put into practice? In other 
words, how is the honor system to func- 
tion as an institution whose aim it is to help 
create an environment which is favorable 
to the development of the sort of honor 
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required of one who is to conform success- 
fully to its code ? Time will permit of only 
two or three suggestions in this connection 
as illustrations of the sort of measures 
which may be employed to accomplish the 
end I have described. 
The first of those suggestions is that the 
freshman's acknowledgment and acceptance 
of the honor code can be made somewhat 
less perfunctory and mechanical than is 
usually the case. When a student matricu- 
lates in a college where the honor system 
is in operation, there is an implied agree- 
ment on his part to uphold its standards. 
But this technicality might well be supple- 
mented by a solemn and impressive cere- 
mony, conducted by student representatives, 
on which occasion all new matriculates 
would be initiated into the honor system, 
as it were, taking upon themselves such 
vows in such terms as would be appropriate 
to the emotional and dramatic features of 
the situation. The psychological effect of a 
ceremony of this sort is obvious. 
Another suggestion I have to make in 
this connection is that the publicity given 
by student officers and leaders to the stand- 
ards embodied in the honor code can be 
made something more than perfunctory ex- 
planations and warnings. Too often such 
publicity aims only at putting the new stu- 
dent on notice, so to speak. The usual at- 
titude seems to be something like this : Here 
are the ideals of the college community; let 
the new student take them or leave them,— 
along with the consequences ! A rather form- 
al sense of justice (and should we not 
add, something closely akin to smug self- 
righteousness ?) requires that the inevitable 
delinquents, when once their violations of 
the honor code prove them to have been 
"devils from the beginning," shall not be 
able to plead ignorance of the law. Hence 
the necessity of some sort of information 
concerning the honor system and its stand- 
ards. But my contention is that this infor- 
mation can and should be conveyed in such 
a manner as to establish in the freshman's 
mind associations and attitudes which will 
make his acceptance of the honor code 
something more than a meaningless techni- 
cality. Constructive publicity, then, as a 
substitute for perfunctory explanations and 
warnings is another way in which the honor 
system can be rendered truly educative in 
its effects. 
And there are various other methods 
which might be employed with results 
equally good, such as a more discriminating 
and intelligent use of the "pledge"; and 
such as the use' of corrective and construc- 
tive forms of punishment as opposed to 
those forms which aim only at vindicating 
and upholding the honor code and at ridding 
the college of its undesirable elements. Our 
time is passing, however, and I must hasten 
on. 
There is another prevalent misconception 
of the honor system to which I wish to call 
your attention. It has to do with what we 
must regard as the very foundation of all 
student government, namely, personal re- 
sponsibility; and it usually manifests itself 
in an unwillingness on the part of one stu- 
dent to assume responsibility for detecting 
and exposing the wrongdoing of another. 
What shall we say of such an attitude? 
Well, there are several things, it seems to 
me, which should be said with reference to 
it. For one thing we shall do well, I think, 
to recognize how prevalent this attitude is. 
We shall also do well to recognize the sin- 
cerity of those who share it. Again we 
might as well face the fact that this is the 
point at which student government is most 
apt to break down. And, finally, it is im- 
portant for us to realize that many of those 
who are opposed to the practice of inform- 
ing on their fellows are able to give very 
definite, and, as they see it, very convincing 
reasons for the faith that is in them. After 
a thorough investigation, extending over two 
or more years, and conducted by means of 
personal inquiry among many students, I 
have come to the conclusion that those who 
are opposed to this principle of reporting 
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the misconduct of others fall into a number 
of clearly marked off groups in accordance 
with the reasons they give for the position 
they take. I wish you to consider during 
the time which remains two or three of 
these reasons in order to determine, if pos- 
sible, whether they have sufficient merit to 
justify the position taken with reference to 
it. 
Some of these reasons are relatively sup- 
erficial and need not, therefore, detain us. 
I refer to such contentions as that the prin- 
ciple of informing on others is unnecessary; 
or that it is extremely difficult and unpleas- 
ant; or that the punishment in which it re- 
sults is too severe; or that the principle is 
inherently odious. An argument which is 
more serious and which merits more con- 
sideration is that the individual student is 
not responsible for exposing the misconduct 
of others because this duty has been dele- 
gated to a student council elected for this 
purpose and authorized, therefore, to act 
for the individual in this capacity. And in 
defense of this attitude, an appeal is usually 
made to the analogy which is said to exist 
between civil society and the college com- 
munity. In civil society there are agencies 
whose sole duty it is to detect and expose 
wrongdoing. To be sure, the existence of 
such agencies does not absolve the individual 
from all moral nor indeed from all legal 
responsibility in this connection. That is 
to say, there are situations in which the in- 
dividual citizen is neither morally nor leg- 
ally free to refrain from reporting to the 
proper authorities the misconduct which 
comes under his observation. But on the 
whole, the welfare of society is best promot- 
ed where every citizen attends to his own 
business. To attend to one's own business, 
therefore, is under ordinary circum- 
stances, an honorable trait so far as 
the citizen is concerned. Now the col- 
lege community under the honor sys- 
tem is like civil society in a democratic 
state in that it sets up certain machinery 
through which it proposes to govern itself. 
It is unlike civil society, however, (and here 
the analogy between the two breaks down) 
in that the personnel of its governmental 
machinery are not primarily policemen or 
judges, but are, on the contrary, students, 
who in the nature of the case cannot be ex- 
clusively depended on to detect and expose 
wrongdoing. Theirs is the duty to investi- 
gate misconduct and to administer punish- 
ment in such cases as come under their 
personal observation, or such as are report- 
ed to them by others. For the most part 
the rank and file of the students themselves 
must be responsible for and take the initia- 
tive in holding to account those whose mis- 
conduct is dishonorable and thus strike at 
the foundations of college life. 
The tradition that "to tell" is not an hon- 
orable thing to do has a more primitive 
basis, however, than this analogy between 
the college community and civil society. It 
reaches back into the earliest training of 
the individual as a member of the family 
and the elementary school. And, if I am 
not mistaken, it is this training which all 
of us get as members of the family and ele- 
mentary school that accounts for the largest 
group of those students who are adverse to 
reporting the misconduct of others. And 
yet there is no analogy between these more 
elementary groups and the college commun- 
ity that justifies carrying over into the lat- 
ter this tradition against concerning oneself 
with the wrongdoing of one's fellows. For, 
mind you, neither the family nor the ele- 
mentary school pretends to be a self-govern- 
ing body. On the contrary, authority is 
vested in parents and teachers, respectively. 
And on the whole parents and teachers find 
it easiest to administer their authority in 
an effective and equitable manner when 
there is a minimum of "spying" or "tat- 
tling." But in a college where student gov- 
ernment prevails, students are in a large 
measure on their own responsibility and 
must, therefore, be prepared to take the 
initiative in upholding their honor code. 
Let me hasten to remind you, however, 
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that under the honor system the student is 
not required to "spy" or to "tattle" or to be 
a "busybody." He is merely required to 
report such cases of misconduct as come 
under his own observation while engaged 
in his own affairs. And he is not at liberty 
to withhold information of such violations 
of honor for the reason that this informa- 
tion rightfully belongs to the student coun- 
cil to whom he as one who has elected to 
live under the honor system has delegated 
the task of upholding the honor code. The 
fact that the knowledge in question was not 
gained as a result of any effort on his part 
but on the contrary was stumbled on, so to 
speak, as one might pick up a purse lost by 
another, does not in any way affect his 
obligations in the matter. The knowledge 
is not his; it belongs to others. To keep it 
locked up in his own mind is no more de- 
fensible, morally, than it would be for one 
to pocket money he had found with no at- 
tempt to identify its rightful owner. And 
this is the reason that, under the honor sys- 
tem, to refrain from reporting violations of 
the honor code is itself regarded as a breach 
of honor. 
There is one other objection to the prin- 
ciple of personal responsibility, as conceiv- 
ed under the honor system, to which I wish 
to call your attention. There are many stu- 
dents who feel that to report or to threaten 
to report the misconduct of another is, in 
effect, to employ a degree of force which 
is strangely out of place in a system of con- 
trol based on honor. The criticism I heard 
expressed most frequently at the recent 
Congress of the National Student Federa- 
tion was "too much system and too little 
honor." Back of this criticism seemed to 
be a feeling that it is inconsistent to regard 
the standards of action included in the hon- 
or system as standards of honor when the 
practice of the standards, so far from being 
left entirely to the voluntary disposition of 
students, is in reality guaranteed by coercive 
measures of the most compelling kind. Has 
this attitude, with the criticism it implies, 
any weight? And how is one who is con- 
cerned to uphold the reasonableness of the 
honor system to meet it? 
Well, it is possible that those who feel 
so sure that honor and coercion cannot be 
combined in any sort of system have over- 
looked or misconceived the real nature of 
group self-control, of which the honor sys- 
tem in college communities is a special case. 
Self-control by groups manifests itself in 
two forms, namely, in morality and in law. 
By morality is meant the control of the 
members of a group from within through 
personal ideals; and by law is meant the 
control of such individuals from without 
by means of legislative enactments enforc- 
ed by agencies competent to inflict appropri- 
ate penalties for violations. But these two 
forms of social control, although distinct in 
their mode of operation, are by no means 
mutually exclusive. For neither is possess- 
ed of a sphere of action peculiar to itself, in 
which it operates to the exclusion of the 
other.. On the contrary, the spheres of 
action in which they respectively operate 
overlap, so that a standard of action may be 
both a matter of morality and a matter of 
law. For example, driving an automobile 
at a reasonable (or legal) rate of speed on 
public highways is for some a personal ideal 
(as well as a law) and operates, so far as 
they are concerned, as an inner control; 
for others, however, it is merely a law im- 
posed from without and enforced by ex- 
traneous penalties. 
Now, the honor system combines within 
itself the two forms of control to which I 
have referred as morality and law, and also 
exhibits the overlapping of their respective 
spheres to which reference has been made. 
In other words, the honor system is, in,, 
reality, a combination of coercion and hon- 
or. And the standards of action embodied 
in its code partake of the nature of both 
law and morality. For many students these 
standards are personal ideals which exer- 
cise an inner control. For such students 
the honor code is simply an announcement 
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to the world of the principles they mean to 
live by in the interest of certain values, 
felt to be fundamental in college life. And 
in living up to this announcement, no coer- 
cion or restraint of any sort may be ex- 
perienced. There is a small minority of 
students in every college, however, for 
whom the honor code is to all intents and 
purposes a legal enactment. Its standards, 
so far as these students are concerned, are 
not personal ideals; and the observance of 
these standards is not at all a matter of 
morality. For such students, on the con- 
trary, the control exercised by these stand- 
ards is entirely external, and is enforced by 
the decrees of a council with penal powers. 
And yet, the existence of such an external 
and coercive form of control within a sys- 
tem which proposes to effect a control of 
conduct primarily from within through a 
sense of honor is, as we have seen, neither 
unusual nor unreasonable. In a group, made 
up of such a diversity of moral types as 
compose the personel of a college commun- 
ity, only such a combination of law and 
morality, coercion and honor, will suffice. 
It must be obvious, however, that this 
conception of a group, some of whose mem- 
bers are so moral as to require no control 
save through their own ideals and others of 
whom are so lacking in morality as to re- 
quire control altogether from without, is 
an undue simplification of the state of af- 
fairs actually existing in a college group, 
or in any other community. In all groups, 
including the college, the dividing line be- 
tween the "good" and "bad," or between 
the "honorable" and the "dishonorable" is 
fluctuating and indistinct. The great mass 
of individuals fall somewhere between these 
moral extremes, either because their ideals 
are not sufficiently inclusive to serve all the 
vital interests of the group, or because these 
ideals, however inclusive they may be, are 
not vigorous enough to function always 
without some support and reinforcement 
from without. And even the best of us, 
if we are but honest enough to admit it, 
have our unfinished areas, our weak mo- 
ments, or both. It may be, therefore, that 
we all need from time to time to be re- 
minded lest we forget, to be enlightened 
lest we become confused, and to be made 
sober and steady in the face of what might 
otherwise cause us to falter. And the ex- 
istence of law and law-like coercions affects 
us in just these ways. Indeed, the law has 
been one of the great educators of the 
human race, one of the schools, if you 
please, in which mankind's morality has 
been nurtured. There is a sense, to be sure, 
in which law may be said to represent the 
institutionalizing of morality. But the law 
has more than repaid the debt it owes to 
the moral insight of the social genius in the 
nurture it has provided for the morality of 
the masses. And as an educative influence, 
it is as indispensible for the average indi- 
vidual of today as it was for the masses of 
individuals in primitive society. 
The average college student, like any 
average individual, has his ideals and his 
convictions. But like any other average indi- 
vidual he is, with respect to goodness or 
character, an unfinished product. At col- 
lege he associates himself with other im- 
mature persons. Together, he and they 
publish abroad the fact that they mean to 
live by certain principles. These principles 
constitute their code of honor. But im- 
mature and idealistic though they be, stu- 
dents realize that some of their number are 
without much appreciation of what they 
ha've agreed to regard as matters of honor, 
and that all of them appreciate some of 
these ideals but inadequately at best. They 
resolve, nevertheless, that these ideals shall 
be maintained, whatever penalties must be 
imposed to maintain them. Whereupon the 
honor code ceases to be a matter of morality 
alone and becomes, in essence, at least, a 
matter of law. But in the meantime no 
violence has been done to the spirit of 
morality. On the contrary, morality has, 
in reality, been supplemented and reinforc- 
ed; supplemented for those who are more 
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or less lacking in the inner sanctions of 
conduct, and reinforced for those the inner 
sanctions of whose conduct may be in need 
of that stimulus, enlargement, and support 
which come only from a subjection to dis- 
cipline which is self-imposed. 
J. R. Geiger 
TEACHING THE APOSTRO- 
PHE OF POSSESSION 
HAD anyone told me when I first 
began teaching that some day I 
would admit that any single mat- 
ter of form in written composition was hard 
to teach, I know I should have been greatly 
humiliated; and had I been told that I would 
admit that the apostrophe of possession was 
more than stubborn about getting taught, I 
think I should have left the teaching ranks 
at once. 
Yet here I am after a number of 
years of getting oriented in what "is 
English"; of reconciling minimum essen- 
tials; of conducting classes in sight-seeing 
trips through English and American litera- 
ture; here I am, making an informal report 
on how I attempt to teach the apostrophe 
of possession! "Picking up pins" I should 
have perhaps termed such work back there 
a few years. 
Had this particular bit of form—spelling, 
perhaps—not run such a high percentage of 
error in the numerous studies of recent 
years of pupil errors in written composition, 
I might never have known the mark was 
poorly taught. Then had it not shown up 
worst in a study of seven formal elements 
I made of my own teaching, I probably 
should not have given it any more thought. 
But when this elusive will-o'-the-wisp 
made the worst showing in my own teach- 
ing, I analyzed the nature of the mistakes 
made in its use and discovered that my 
forty-six sophomores—tenth-grade high 
school—misused the apostrophe of posses- 
sion in a series of dictation exercises in 
which it was one of the problems, accord- 
ing to the following distribution of types 
of errors. 
57%, omitting the apostrophe 
15%, placing the apostrophe after the j in singu- 
lar nouns 
12%, placing the apostrophe after the s in irreg- 
ular plurals 
8%, placin^ the apostrophe before the j in 
plural nouns 
6%, placing the apostrophe before the s in 
singular nouns ending in s, as James 
3%, unnecessary use of the apostrophe 
2%, confusing the apostrophe with the comma 
This bit of analysis caused me to plan a 
definite method of attack on the apostrophe 
of possession alone. Twice since, I have 
done this, each time refining my method; 
and not yet have I been able to take the 
improvement, as shown by a closing-up test, 
beyond a fifty percent improvement. How- 
ever, I had evidence that attention had been 
permanently directed to the pestiferous 
mark. Each time that I have tried the ex- 
periment, I have had the individual co- 
operation of the pupils, who always seem 
to puzzle as much about the elusive nature 
of that apostrophe as I do about their slow- 
ness to capture it. 
There are no less than ten different ways 
in which a pupil may go wrong in the use 
of that apostrophe of possession! I did not 
know it until I began to isolate its uses for 
the purposes of incorporating them in ex- 
ercises for dictation. Briefly, these are: 
(1) Omission of the apostrophe; (2) Its 
unnecessary use; (3) Placing the apostro- 
phe on top of the s; (4) Placing the apos- 
trophe after the s when it should be before; 
(5) Before when it should be after; (6) 
In irregular plurals; (7) In nouns ending 
in ^ all the time, as Charles; (8) In joint 
ownership; (9) Confusing its with ifs; 
(10) In possessive modifiers of gerunds. 
The plan for the experiment is quite sim- 
ple. It consists of an initial test of forty-five 
sentences, arranged in cycles of nine; that 
is, each group of nine sentences occurs in 
the same order as does the first nine. This 
test so arranged is for diagnostic purposes, 
and for comparison with a similar one given 
at the close of the experiment. 
